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Abstract
How communication systems emerge is a topic of relevance to several academic
disciplines. Numerous existing models, both mathematical and computational,
study this emergence. However, with few exceptions, these models all build some
form of communication into their initial specification. Consequently, what these
models study is how communication systems transition from one form to another,
and not how communication itself emerges in the first place. Here we present a new
computational model of the emergence of communication which, unlike previous
models, does not pre-specify the existence of communication. We conduct two
experiments using this model, in order to derive general statements about how
communication systems emerge. The two main routes to communication that we
identify correspond with findings from the empirical literature on the evolution of
animal signals. We use this finding to explain when and why we should expect
communication to emerge in nature. We also compare our model to experimental
research on the origins of human communication systems, and hence show that
humans are an important exception to the general trends we observe. We argue
that this is because humans, and probably only humans, are able to ‘signal
signalhood’, i.e. to express communicative intentions.
Introduction
Communication is a critical source of information for organisms, which allows
them to successfully navigate their local ecology, including their social
environment. Correspondingly, the origins and evolution of communication is a
central topic for several disciplines (e.g. behavioural ecology, artificial life,
cognitive science), and has implications for many others, including the human
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behavioural sciences [1–7]. Many existing models study and seek to explain
various aspects of this emergence [2, 3, 5, 8]. One particularly fertile area of study
is the use of computational and mathematical models to study the origins and
evolution of human language (see e.g. [9–11] for reviews).
However, with few exceptions (see below), these models all build in the fact of
communication from the outset, and in doing so preclude study of how
communication emerges from scratch. Specifically, previous models typically pre-
define at least one of the following: the communication channel; the roles of
signaller and receiver; or the forms that signals and/or responses can take. For
example, in one representative study, some agents were labelled as ‘transmitters’,
who sent either a ‘0’ or ‘1’ signal; and other agents, labelled ‘receivers’, then used
the signal to determine between two distinct behaviours [12]. In short, both the
roles of signaller and receiver were pre-defined, as were the forms that signals and
responses can take. Consequently, this model does not (and is not able to) study
the emergence of communication, and the conditions that give rise to it. Instead,
it investigates whether and how an already existing system will evolve to take a
different (more optimal) form. The same is true of the vast majority of existing
mathematical and computational models.
In order to simulate the actual origins of communication itself, we should, in
contrast to this previous work, define only a set of possible actions for the agents,
and investigate the conditions under which these actions take on communicative
functions (i.e. become either signals or responses). There is one existing
computational simulation that does this [13]. Here, simulated robots evolved a
rudimentary form of communication, despite the fact that none of the above
aspects of communication were pre-defined. However, this research did not
explore the conditions under which communication would and would not
emerge; it simply showed that it is in principle possible to study this emergence.
As such, this research ‘‘showed the potential for… models to look at the real
origin of communication’’ ([14], italics added) – but this potential has not been
exploited. In particular, neither that study, nor any other subsequent research,
investigated the specific conditions under which communication would and
would not emerge from an initial non-communicative state. In short, no study to
date has experimentally investigated the ‘‘real’’ origins of communication
(Figure 1).
Here we present a new computational simulation designed to address these
issues. Specifically, we present a stochastic, computational simulation in which
agents would benefit from communication, but where communication itself is not
pre-specified. Instead, the agents simply have behaviours they can perform, or not.
In other words, we provide only the most basic ‘equipment’ for communication
to occur, but do not pre-specify whether or how this equipment should be used.
In this way, we investigate the ‘‘real’’ origins of communication, in the sense that
no communicative function is built into any behaviour a priori, and must instead
evolve (just as was the case in ref. [13]). The key question we seek to address is
whether there are any general statements that can be made about how
communication systems emerge. To answer this question, we run the simulation
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in a number of different experimental conditions. This allows us to investigate in a
controlled way the conditions under which behaviours take on the roles of signals
and responses; in other words, the conditions under which communication does
and does not emerge. Otherwise, the simulation is designed to be as simple as
possible, in order to make interpretation of the results tractable. In the discussion
we link our results to the empirical literatures on (i) the evolution of animal
signals, and (ii) experimental research on the origins of human communication
systems.
General Methods
Here, we describe the general set-up of the simulations. Full details are provided
in Document S1.
Mobile agents inhabit a two-dimensional square lattice, which contains
(inexhaustible) sources of food at random locations. Each agent has a light, which
can be turned on or off. If the agent is located on a food source, it consumes food,
effectively adding to its fitness. Agents move around the lattice in a way
determined by a strategy that may vary from one individual to another (see
below). Each generation lasts for a fixed number of timesteps, after which agents
reproduce asexually, with mutation, in a way that the expected number of
offspring an individual had is proportional to the amount of food consumed.
Mutation involves the replacement, with probability m, of one of the parameters b,
c, m, or d (see below), with a different value drawn at random from the
corresponding distribution.
Figure 1. Comparison with previous research. The vast majority of research on the evolution of communication to date has studied how pre-existing
systems evolve to take on other, typically more optimal forms. Here, we instead investigate how behaviour can evolve to take on a communicative function in
the first place.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113636.g001
Simulating the Real Origins of Communication
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0113636 November 26, 2014 3 / 12
A particular agent’s strategy is determined by the values of four parameters, as
follows:
- Movement is determined by the two parameters mn[0,1] (‘mobility’) and
dn[21,1] (‘directionality’). An agent moves to one of its eight neighbouring
lattice sites with probability m. If an agent does move, its direction must be
determined. With probability |d| this direction is towards (if d.0) or away
from (if d,0) the nearest light source emanating from an agent of the same
species; otherwise it moves in a random direction. In short, the mobility
parameter determines the overall propensity to move, and the direction
parameter determines the propensity for movement to be a specific direction.
- In a similar way, the use of lights is determined by the two parameters bn[0,1]
(‘brightness’) and cn[21,1] (‘contrast’). An agent is programmed to use its
light with probability b. If an agent does use its light, exactly what
environmental circumstances it will turn the light on for must be determined.
With probability |c| the outcome of this decision is determined by the presence
(if c.0) or absence (if c,0) of food; otherwise the light is turned on at
random. In short, the brightness parameter determines the overall propensity
for the light to be used, and the contrast parameter determines the propensity
for the state of the light to be informative about the presence or absence of
food.
In this way, lights can potentially be used as signals, to indicate the presence of
food, but, crucially, this is not something that is necessarily pre-defined. Instead,
whether the lights are used at all, whether that use correlates with the presence of
food, and whether other agents attend to the lights, depends on the values of the
four parameters described above. To measure this, we define the variable A
(action) as the product of b and c, and the variable R (reaction) as the product of
m and d. If both are equal or close to 1, we can say that communication exists. By
using two rather than one parameter for each behaviour, we separate an overall
propensity to perform the behaviour from the part of the behaviour that plays a
role in communication. This will allow us to directly observe the emergence of
these propensities.
Each agent’s light is visible only to other agents of the same species i.e. only
those with the same parameter values. This means that, although dishonesty (the
use of lights when not on food) and information suppression (the non-use of
lights when on food) are possible, there is no incentive to either once
communication is established, because a mutant individual who does one of these
things will not obtain any benefit from the majority behaviour in the population
at large.
The inclusion of a mechanism of this sort is a reasonable one given our goals,
and given the ubiquity of communication in the natural world, where
communication must be more-or-less stable much of the time (it is of course
possible that some natural occurring cases of communication are unstable, but it
is vanishingly unlikely that this is true in general). How stability is ensured is a
much studied question for the evolution of communication [2, 4]. However,
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questions of stability are orthogonal to questions of emergence, and so we
neutralise issues of stability, in order to directly study the conditions under which
initially non-communicative behaviours will evolve into signals and responses.
We choose kin discrimination to do this only because it is easy to implement, and
allows us to observe the emergence of communication straightforwardly. (Note
also that notions of dishonesty and information suppression only make sense if a
communication system actually exists; for this reason, we use the term
‘unreliability’ as a more general term to describe the use of lights when not on
food, whether or not a communication system actually exists.) We discuss the
effects of this manipulation in the Discussion.
It is important to be clear that, while there is only one viable mode of
communication in this design, that does not mean that the fact of communication
is itself pre-specified. The task we are interested in is not how to choose between
multiple different modes of communication. Instead, we wish to ask whether and
how communication will emerge, given the existence of behaviours that could in
principle be used to communicate. As such, the inclusion of only one viable mode
of communication is the right approach, since it removes other factors that might
complicate our analysis. In this way, our design is formally analogous to the
Embodied Communication Game, a task used to experimentally investigate how
pairs of interacting humans create new systems of communication [15]. There
too, there was only one viable mode of communication, but whether and how
human participants were actually able to make use of it was a non-trivial question.
After we have presented the results of our simulation, we will compare them to the
results of this previous experimental work.
Experiment 1: Two processes of emergence
To establish a baseline for subsequent manipulations, we first ran the simulation
with initial parameter values b5c5m5d50 (and so A5R50 also). As with all
manipulations described below, we performed 500 runs of the simulation, each
for 1,000 generations. In this baseline condition communication never emerged,
even though it would have been adaptive: the most abundant species in the final
state has values of b, c, m and d that were all close or equal to 0, and at no point
did any of these values exceed 0.1. This result is consistent with the findings of our
previous mathematical model, which showed that a state of no interaction is
evolutionarily stable [16].
Next, we ran the simulation with initial parameter values that effectively pre-
specified the existence of either actions or reactions. Specifically, we first ran the
simulation with initial parameter values that pre-specify that agents move towards
lights: c5m5d51, b50 i.e. a pre-specified reaction. We did this under two
different experimental conditions. In the ‘free’ condition, mutations cause any
one of the four parameters (b, c, m, d) to change (each with equal probability).
The ‘bounded’ condition is identical, except that the parameter c51 is kept fixed
throughout. This ensures that lights only ever signal food i.e. that lights cannot
ever be used unreliably. The purpose of this comparison between free and
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bounded conditions is to provide a measure of the extent to which, despite the
fact that there is no selective pressure to use lights unreliably (see above), the
possibility that lights might be used unreliably (e.g. because of drift) affects the
probability that communication will emerge. To do this, we take the most
abundant species at the end of each simulation, calculate A for this species, and
then take two measurements of A: its mean final value over the different runs
within each condition; and its full distribution over the different different runs
within each condition. These measurements can then be compared across
different conditions.
We also ran the simulation with with initial parameter values that pre-specify
that agents turn on lights when on food: b5c5d51, m50 i.e. a pre-specified
action. Again, we did this under a free condition (all parameters liable to
mutation) and a bounded condition (d51 is kept fixed throughout). In this case,
the bounded condition ensures that, if agents do travel around the lattice, they
will only ever travel towards lights, rather than at random. Here, the comparison
between free and bounded conditions provides a measure of the extent to which
the possibility that agents might ignore lights affects the probability that
communication will emerge. We can measure this is in the same ways as described
above, but for R rather than A.
In sum, experiment 1 used a 262 design: bounded vs. unbounded crossed with
pre-specified actions vs. pre-specified reactions. The two main questions we
wished to ask were: (i) Does the possibility that the behaviours in question
(movement; turning on lights) might be used ‘unreliably’ affect the probability
that communication will emerge, independently of any effects they have on
communication itself?; and (ii) Is communication more likely to emerge when
actions or reactions are pre-specified, or are these two sets of initial conditions
equivalent in this respect? Question (i) will be answered by the free vs. bounded
comparison, and question (ii) will be answered by the pre-specified actions vs.
pre-specified reactions comparison. Since the sample size is quite large (500
independent simulation runs for each condition), it is appropriate to use a two-
sided two-sample z-test to compare the mean final values of A and R. (Although
the underlying distribution of A and R are not normal, the central limit theorem
implies that the distributions of their means are, and hence tests assuming such
normality can be used.).
Results are summarised in Figure 2. As can be seen, the difference between the
mean final values of A (conditions in which the reaction is pre-specified) is highly
significant (p54.71610219), whilst the difference between the mean final values
of R (conditions in which the reaction is pre-specified) is not (p50.175). To
compare the full distributions of these final values of A and R, we used a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test, which makes no assumptions about the form of
the distribution. We find similar results i.e. a highly-significant difference when
the reaction is pre-specified (p51.78610230), and no difference when the action
is pre-specified (p50.172). This means that the answer to question (i), above, is
yes, but only for pre-existing reactions. In other words, the possibility that lights
might be used unreliably diminishes the likelihood that communication will
Simulating the Real Origins of Communication
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emerge, even when agents have no incentive to use lights unreliably – but there is
no similar result for ‘unreliably’ following lights. Question (ii) should also be
answered in the affirmative: communication is more likely to emerge when
actions are pre-specified, rather than reactions. Moreover, this difference is not
fully explained by the results above: there is a highly significant difference between
the pre-specified actions and pre-specified reactions (z-test: p54.55610223; K-S
test: p53.20610223; these results are for the bounded condition only).
Taken together, this pair of results suggests that, although the relative potential
of prospective ‘signals’ and ‘responses’ to be used unreliably is one factor that
affects the emergence of communication, it is not the only factor. We thus
designed a second experiment to investigate what other factors are at play.
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. Figure 2a shows the mean action and reaction strengths at the end of
the simulations in Experiment 1, under both free and bounded conditions (‘free’5‘all parameters subject to
mutation’; ‘bounded’5‘one parameter fixed to ensure that unreliability is impossible’). Figure 2b shows the
cumulative distributions of action and reaction strengths, under the same conditions, such that when one line
lies above another, the quantity under investigation is skewed to higher values. Both figures show that the
bounded manipulation makes no difference to the likelihood that communication will emerge when the action
pre-exists, but it does make a difference when the reaction pre-exists.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113636.g002
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Experiment 2: Emergence depends on adaptive value of prior
behaviour
We hypothesised that the reason why communication was more likely to emerge
when actions rather than reactions were pre-specified was that equal propensities
to manipulate the light (brightness, b) and to move around the system (mobility,
m) may not lead to equal payoffs when communication is absent. To illustrate,
compare a hypothetical agent X, which has m?0 (and so moves randomly in the
absence of lights), with a hypothetical agent Y, which has m50 (and so simply
does not move at all). In the absence of lights, agent X will explore a greater
proportion of the lattice than Y, and hence is more likely to find food by chance.
Compare now the hypothetical agents W, which has b?0 (and so turns on light
when on food), and Z, which has b50 (and so does not turn on their light). Here,
in the absence of other agents moving towards lights, agent W does no better (and
no worse) than agent Z. What this pair of comparisons show is that an increased
propensity to move can be adaptive regardless of any effect this might have on the
emergence of communication – but there is no equivalent result for turning on
lights. Effects of this general sort are implicit in some other models. If this verbal
analysis is correct, there is a greater incentive to move than to turn on the light
when communication is not established, and this could in turn increase the
probability that communication will emerge if actions are pre-specified, relative to
the probability that communication will emerge if reactions are pre-specified. A
manipulation that neutralises this difference should equalise the corresponding
probabilities.
To test this, we ran four further conditions. In experiment 1, agents’ scores were
set to zero at the start of each generation (call these ‘natural’ conditions). We
instead ran ‘neutral’ conditions, in which agents’ scores are set at the start of each
generation to a value drawn from distribution that describes the scores that agents
will accrue by moving around the lattice without interacting with other agents (we
obtained this distribution by sampling the amount of food consumed by agents
for given values of m, and ascribing scores from the distribution so obtained to
agents with the corresponding value of b; see Document S2 for details). We did
this for the same four conditions as in experiment 1 (i.e. both free and bounded,
for both pre-specified actions and pre-specified reactions).
The results supported our analysis (Figure 3). Under the neutral manipulation,
the means of all four distributions are more similar to each other, and closer to
the values previously found when the action was pre-specified. Most importantly,
in contrast to experiment 1, there is no significant difference between the case of a
pre-specified action and that of a pre-specified reaction under either the free (z-
test: p50.479; K-S test: p50.902) or bounded condition (z-test: p50.0771; K-S
test: p50.226) when the neutral manipulation was imposed. This confirms that
the reason for the difference between pre-specified actions and pre-specified
reactions in Experiment 1 is the adaptive value of increased movement in the
absence of communication, as proposed above. What this result illustrates is that
whether the pre-existing reaction is adaptive itself, or is adaptively neutral, will
Simulating the Real Origins of Communication
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affect the probability than communication will emerge. We see no reason why this
same point could not in principle apply to pre-existing actions too. In light of this,
we present, in Document S3, a refinement of our previous mathematical model
[16], to take this factor into account.
General Discussion
Taken as a whole, our results suggest a number of general statements that can be
made about how communication systems emerge. First, there are two processes by
which communication can emerge by natural selection: pre-existing actions or
pre-existing reactions (without either of these, communication did not emerge).
Second, although these two process are mathematically equivalent to one another
in most respects, they differ in (at least) one important way, namely that pre-
specification of reactions is more liable to collapse due to issues of unreliability
than is pre-specification of actions. Third, the relative probability of each process
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. As with Figure 2, this figure shows both the mean action and reaction
strengths at the end of the simulations (Figure 3a), and the culmulative distributions of action and reaction
strengths (Figure 3b). Here, unlike Figure 2, there is no marked difference between equivalent conditions with
pre-specified actions and pre-specified reactions. As we highlight in the Discussion, these results, when
combined with the results of Experiment 1 (see Figure 2), can explain why there are more reports in the
empirical literature of the emergence of communication in some ways rather than others.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113636.g003
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is also affected by the adaptive value of the pre-existing actions or reactions are
adaptive.
Our approach here was inspired by and built upon our previous mathematical
model [16]. That model was based upon the abstract mathematical framework of
evolutionary game theory, and made several simplifying assumptions (e.g. spatial
mixing; no demographic stochasticity; all agents having equal access to the same
environmental states, the same signals, and so on; and others). By using an agent-
based model, we have been able in this paper to investigate the same topic
experimentally, and in a more concrete system i.e. one in which each agent has its
own autonomy, where there is stochasticity of various relevant sorts, and so on. In
this way, our results endorse and expand upon the findings of our previous
model. Specifically, our models here endorse the finding of our previous model
that the emergence of communication requires pre-existing actions or reactions;
and they expand upon our previous model by highlighting the fact that the
probability that these pre-existing behaviours will actually become signals/
responses depends upon their relative contribution to fitness. In this way, our
models provide a way to disentangle how different aspects of behaviour contribute
to different aspects of the process of emergence (the emergence of signals, the
emergence of responses, and the contribution each makes to fitness). We have
formalised these differences in the updated version of our mathematical model
provided in Document S3.
Most models concerned with the evolution of communication focus on issues
of stability. We abstracted away from these issues, in order to focus on the
orthogonal topic of emergence (see Introduction). If dishonesty had been
permitted in our model, would it have completed matters, and led to different
results? Our previous mathematical model suggested that the potential for
dishonesty would have one specific effect: it would make it more likely that
communication would emerge when the action is pre-specified, rather than the
reaction (i.e. by a process of ritualization, rather than sensory manipulation; see
below) [16]. The reason for this is that in the former case the actor must already
receive some benefit from the pre-existing action, independent of the effects the
action has on the reactor (otherwise the action would not exist) – but in the latter
case there is no equivalent foundation: there is no reason why the reactor must
receive any prior benefit from the pre-existing reaction. This result also holds in
our new mathematical model, which updates our previous model in light of the
findings in this paper (see Document S3 for the updated mathematical model).
Further research on the exact nature of the interaction between emergence and
stability is warranted.
How do our results relate to the empirical literature on the evolution of animal
signals? This literature has established two processes by which communication
systems can emerge, and these two processes correspond to the two processes we
have identified in our model. The first is ritualization, in which agents evolve to
take advantage of the fact that some other agent’s behaviour correlates with (i.e. is
informative about) some aspect of the world. In other words, an action pre-exists,
and this provides the selective environment for the evolution of a reaction. One
Simulating the Real Origins of Communication
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classic example is the use of urine to signal territorial boundaries, which
originated from animals leaving their territory to urinate [2]. The other process is
sensory manipulation, in which the opposite occurs: a reaction pre-exists, and this
provides the environmental context for the evolution of a ‘signal’. An example is
the offering of nuptial gifts, from males to females, that occurs in many insect
species; in many cases, the female has a pre-existing mechanism that prioritised
the opportunity to feed on large prey, and so the presentation of food gave the
male an opportunity to mate (ibid.). Our results describe the initial conditions
necessary for these two processes to occur.
How do our results relate to experimental research on the origins of human
communication systems? (For reviews of this literature, see refs. [6, 17].) Like the
existing modelling literature on the emergence of communication, most
experimental studies with humans pre-define important aspects of the commu-
nicative interaction itself [15]. However, there are a small number of studies that
do not do this [15, 18, 19]. In these studies, participants are faced with a task that
is formally equivalent to our simulation with initial parameter values
b5c5m5d50 (experiment 1). However, unlike this condition in our simulation,
in which communication did not emerge, the participants in these experiments
were able to create new communication systems. How can this difference be
explained? The participants in this and similar experiments succeeded because
they were able to communicate the fact that they were trying to communicate; in
other words, they were able to ‘signal signalhood’. This allowed them to create
new systems without the prior existence of actions or reactions. This ability to
signal signalhood requires sophisticated forms of social cognition, in particular
rich metacognition i.e. on the ability to reason about others’ intentions, beliefs,
and so on [7, 19–21]. It is quite possible, even likely, that no other species has
these abilities to the extent that is required here [22]. If true, this can explain the
differences in the results of those studies and the simulations presented here [7].
We would to conclude by reiterating that the distinctive feature of our model in
this paper was that the existence of communication is not pre-specified in any way
(see Introduction). To our knowledge, only one previous model did this [13].
However, that model was not used to experimentally test the different conditions
under which communication would emerge. We have done this, and have hence
been able to study the conditions under which non-communicative behaviour
might take on a communicative function: the real origins of communication.
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